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Abstract We reconsider the allocational invariance of equilibria to different
formulations of market completeness. We identify the so-far neglected assumption
of sophisticated behavior as being crucial. First, the Arrow–Debreu setting is consid-
ered, where markets do not reopen in the future. Second, sequentially complete markets
are analyzed, where goods on the spot markets and all contingent one-period ahead
commodities can be traded in every state. Finally, complete markets are analyzed,
where all possible contingent commodities can be traded at every state. Preferences
may be time-consistent or time-inconsistent. A distinction is made between naïve and
sophisticated behavior.
Keywords Time-inconsistency · Competitive equilibrium · Market completeness ·
Allocational equivalence
JEL Classification D51 · D61 · D91
1 Introduction
Debreu (1959) discusses how the one-period Arrow–Debreu (1954) model can be
used to analyze multi-period settings with uncertainty. The crucial idea is to include
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the period and the state of the world at the time of delivery in the definition of a
commodity, resulting in contingent commodities. Debreu assumes that markets are
complete in the sense that all contingent commodities can be traded in the first period
and does not allow for markets to reopen after the first period.
As an alternative to the assumption that all contingent commodities can be traded
in the initial period, sequentially complete markets have been considered. In a sequen-
tially complete market structure, it is typically assumed that at every state there are
complete spot markets for commodities available at that state together with a restricted
set of markets for commodities available at future states. It is well-known that, under
certain assumptions, equilibria in the Arrow-Debreu model are allocationally equiva-
lent to equilibria in sequentially complete models, see Arrow (1953). Donaldson and
Selden (1981) and Haller (1990) provide two discussions of the assumptions needed
for this result. Drèze and Herings (2003) show in an example that there might be
equilibrium continuations in a sequentially complete markets setting that are not allo-
cationally equivalent to any equilibrium in the Arrow–Debreu setting. A closer look
at their example suggests that the result is driven by the fact that in the Arrow–Debreu
setting, markets are not reopened. Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) consider differ-
ences between complete and sequentially complete market structures in overlapping
generations models.
This paper studies multi-period economies subject to uncertainty, where markets
may reopen at future states. At every state, households are endowed with preferences
that may or may not be time-consistent. In general equilibrium models, time-incon-
sistent preferences have been introduced by Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) and Herings
and Rohde (2006). We consider three market structures that are commonly believed to
result in the same set of competitive equilibria. First, we consider the Arrow–Debreu
(AD) structure with complete markets in the first period and no reopening of markets
as time passes. Second, we consider sequentially complete (SC) markets, where in
every state, people can trade the goods to be consumed in that state and all one-period
ahead contingent commodities. Finally, we consider the complete (C) market struc-
ture. We say that markets are complete if, in every state, there are complete markets
for all contingent commodities to be consumed in that state or in a later state.
Figure 1 indicates which markets are open at various periods under these three market
structures in an economy with four periods.
We follow Pollak (1968) in making a distinction between naïve and sophisticated
behavior. Whereas naïve households believe that their preferences will not change in
the future, sophisticated households correctly anticipate their future preferences. The
latter households make plans that they expect to stick to in the future. Sophisticated
households can be interpreted as consisting of multiple agents, playing a subgame
perfect equilibrium against themselves. We will analyze these two types of behavior
for both time-consistent and time-inconsistent preferences.
In general, the Arrow–Debreu market structure leads to equilibrium allocations that
differ from equilibrium allocations corresponding to the other two market structures.
The explanation is that the Arrow–Debreu market structure yields the commitment
power needed not to re-trade. For sophisticated economies, sequentially complete
markets yield the same allocations as complete markets do, even when preferences are
allowed to be time-inconsistent. The assumption of sophisticated behavior is extremely
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Fig. 1 Commodities traded
simultaneously in a four-period
economy
Fig. 2 Naïve equilibria when
preferences are time-consistent
Fig. 3 Sophisticated equilibria
when preferences are
time-consistent
demanding. It might be more reasonable to assume that households, at least partly,
mispredict their future preferences (Loewenstein et al. 2003). For naïve economies
any sequentially complete equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some complete
equilibrium, but the converse statement does not hold.
When preferences are time-consistent, we show that all three markets structures
are allocationally equivalent for sophisticated economies. For naïve economies, every
equilibrium in the Arrow–Debreu market structure is allocationally equivalent to some
sequentially complete equilibrium and some complete equilibrium, but surprisingly
the reverse does not hold. The results of this paper are summarized in Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
In those figures, an arrow from ‘A’ to ‘B’ indicates that any concept ‘A’ equilibrium
allocation is allocationally equivalent to some concept ‘B’ equilibrium allocation.
This paper therefore identifies a crucial assumption that has to be satisfied in order
for complete and sequentially complete markets to be equivalent: behavior should
123
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Fig. 4 Naïve equilibria when
preferences are time-inconsistent
Fig. 5 Sophisticated equilibria
when preferences are
time-inconsistent
be sophisticated. For equivalence to Arrow–Debreu markets, it is also needed that
preferences are time-consistent.
Section 2 starts by describing the primitives of the economies as considered in
this paper, without elaborating on market structures. Section 3 describes the Arrow–
Debreu market structure. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the sequentially complete markets
structure and the complete one, respectively. Both these sections are built up in the
same fashion. First, naïve and sophisticated behavior is described. Then, properties of
the specific market structure are studied. Section 6 then concludes. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
2 The primitives of the economy
There is a finite number of periods, denoted by the integer T .1 In every period t ∈
{2, . . . , T }, exactly one event in the finite set  occurs. A sequence of T − 1 events
constitutes a state. We let S = T −1 be the set of states. For every s ∈ S and every





τ=2 ∈ t−1 | ∃ (ωτ )Tτ=t+1 ∈ T −t with (ωτ )Tτ=2 = s
}
.
For t = 1, we define s(1) = 1.
Figure 6 illustrates the structure of an economy with four periods (T = 4) and two
events in every period ( = {Bad, Good}). A state in period 4 is a path from the root of
the tree to an end-node. Thus, in the figure there are eight states in period 4. Consider
the state that corresponds to the path that leads to the third end-node from above. We
call this state s3 = (B, G, B). We have s3(2) = B, s3(3) = (B, G), and s3(4) =
(B, G, B). For every s(t) we define s+(t) = {s′(t + 1) ∈ t |s′ ∈ S, s′(t) = s(t)}.
1 As no confusion will arise, for finite sets we will use the same notation to indicate the set and its cardinality.
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Fig. 6 An economy with T = 4
and  = {Bad, Good}
The economy consists of a finite number of households h ∈ H. In every state of
every period, households consume a finite number of goods l ∈ L . For s ∈ S and
τ ≥ t, the consumption bundle xhs(τ )|s(t) denotes the consumption of every good at
state s(τ ) anticipated in state s(t). Consumption for state s(t) and every later state
anticipated at s(t), is given by the consumption plan xh·|s(t). Consumption for state
s(τ ) and all states that can be reached from there up till period τ ′, as anticipated in
state s(t), is given by xhs(τ ),τ ′|s(t). By x
h
·|s(t)  x̂ h·|s(τ ), we denote the consumption xh·|s(t)
with xhs(τ ),T |s(t) replaced by x̂
h
·|s(τ ). For t ∈ T, we define Lt = L
∑T −t
τ=1 τ , the total
number of commodities to be consumed at states later than s(t). Consumption in every
state is limited to the consumption sets Xh·|s(t) ⊂ RL+Lt , where the interpretation of
sub- and superscripts is similar as before. A subscript l is added to denote consumption
of good l. In every state s(t), households have initial endowments eh·|s(t). Households
are assumed to have correct expectations about consumption sets and endowments.
In every state, households have preferences over consumption in that state and all
possible future states. Preferences of household h in state s(t) are represented by
h,s(t), a relation defined on Xh·|s(t). The preferences of household h are denoted by
h= (h,s(t))s∈S,t∈T .
Preferences might depend on the state of nature and can change over time. Consider
a consumption plan in state s(t). If we replace consumption from a future state s(τ ) on
by consumption that will be preferred once state s(τ ) is reached, then time-consistency
of preferences implies that the resulting consumption plan at state s(t) is preferred to
the original one.
Definition 2.1 (Time-consistent preferences) Preferences for household h are time-
consistent if for all states s ∈ S, for all periods t, τ with τ ≥ t, for every xh·|s(t) ∈ Xh·|s(t)
and every x̂ h·|s(τ ) ∈ Xh·|s(τ ), we have
xh·|s(t) h,s(t) xh·|s(t)  x̂ h·|s(τ )
123
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if and only if
xhs(τ ),T |s(t) h,s(τ ) x̂ h·|s(τ ).
Preferences are time-inconsistent if they are not time-consistent.
Preferences of a household in a particular state s(t) are locally non-satiated in state
s(t ′), where t ′ ≥ t, if for every consumption plan in state s(t), we can find another
consumption plan in state s(t) that (i) only deviates from the initial consumption plan
in state s(t ′), (ii) is arbitrarily close to the initial consumption plan, and (iii) is pre-
ferred to the initial consumption plan. This can be formalized as follows. Consider a
household h, a state s, and two periods t, t ′ with t ′ ≥ t. Preferences h,s(t) are locally
non-satiated in s(t ′) if for every xh·|s(t) ∈ Xh·|s(t), for every ε > 0, there is an xh·|s(t) ∈
Xh·|s(t) with x
h
s′(τ )|s(t) = xhs′(τ )|s(t) for every s′(τ ) = s(t ′), ‖ xh·|s(t) − xh·|s(t) ‖< ε
and xh·|s(t) 
h,s(t) xh·|s(t). An economy with preferences
(h,s(t))h∈H,s∈S,t∈T is locally
non-satiated if for every state s and every t, t ′ with t ′ ≥ t there is a household h such
that h,s(t) is locally non-satiated in s(t ′).
An economy E is described by its primitives (Xh·|1, eh·|1,h)h∈H . A household will
sell its endowments and use the revenues from this sale to buy the goods the household
desires most. The timing of the opportunities to sell endowments will depend on the
market structure.
3 Arrow–Debreu markets
This section considers the model of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959).
There are complete markets in contingent commodities in period 1. Markets do not
reopen in later periods. All commodities can be traded in period 1 against the prices
p·|1. Prices for commodities in state s(t) are then given by ps(t)|1. Prices for state s(t)
and all states that can be reached from s(t) are denoted by ps(t),T |1. We denote the set
of possible prices by P·|1 = RL+L1 .
In the Arrow–Debreu model, markets do not reopen after period 1. Therefore, it is
implicitly assumed that consumption in those later periods is completely determined
by the choices made in period 1. Moreover, since markets do not reopen after period 1,
there is no need to specify prices in periods after period 1. To be consistent in notation
throughout this paper, we do want to specify those prices. Without loss of generality,
we set prices in states later than period 1 equal to the prices in period 1 of corre-
sponding contingent commodities. We define p·|s(t) = ps(t),T |1 for every s(t), and
P·|s(t) = RL+Lt and P = ∏s(t) P·|s(t).
The opportunity set of household h in period 1 is given by
γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1) = {xh·|1 ∈ Xh·|1 | p·|1xh·|1 ≤ p·|1eh·|1}.
The opportunity set of household h in any state s(t) with t > 1 is given by
γ̆ hs(t)(p·|s(t), x
h
s(t),T |s(t−1)) = {xhs(t),T |s(t−1)}.
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A household selects a most preferred consumption plan in the opportunity set. Thus,
















In equilibrium, total demand must equal total endowments. For notational purposes,
we define xh1,T |s(0) = eh·|1.
Definition 3.1 (Arrow–Debreu (AD) equilibrium) A pair (p∗, x∗) ∈ P × X is an
Arrow–Debreu (AD) equilibrium of the economy E if





h∈H eh·|s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
(c) p∗·|s(t) = p∗s(t),T |1 for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S.
4 Sequentially complete markets
This section considers sequentially complete markets. In every state there are spot mar-
kets and forward markets for one-period ahead contingent commodities. In period t
households can trade all goods for period t and all goods for all possible events in period
t + 1. They have to form expectations about prices for goods that will be consumed
in later periods, i.e., periods from t + 2 on. We assume that they form point expec-
tations and that all households form the same expectations. We let P·|s(t) = RL+Lt ,
Q·|s(t) = RLt , P =
∏
s(t) P·|s(t) and Q =
∏
s(t) Q·|s(t). Prices and expected (at state
s(t)) prices on spot markets will be denoted by p·|s(t) ∈ P·|s(t). Prices and expected
(at state s(t)) prices of forward commodities will be denoted by q·|s(t) ∈ Q·|s(t). The
(expected) prices in state s(t) of commodities to be delivered in state s(τ ) and traded in







For household h the forward commodity bundle for state s(τ ) that is expected in state
s(t) to be bought in state s(τ − 1) is denoted by yhs(τ )|s(t). For notational purposes, we
define yh·|s(0) = eh·|1 and yhs(t)|s(t) = yhs(t)|s(t−1).
The structure of sequentially complete markets is illustrated in Fig. 7. There, rows
refer to the period in which the commodities are bought and columns refer to the
period in which the commodities are delivered. The first block of four rows refers to
the perspective of a household in period 1. The next blocks are the perspectives of the
households in the next periods. Bullets indicate that the prices and consumption are
directly observable in the markets, open bullets denote expectations.
When markets can reopen in the future, and preferences are allowed to be time-
inconsistent, a conflict can arise between the preferences from the perspective of one
state and those of another, later, state. Following Pollak (1968), we make a distinction
between naïve and sophisticated households. Naïve households will typically revise
their plans over time. They have the incorrect belief that their preferences will not
123
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Fig. 7 Structure of sequentially
complete markets
change in the future. Sophisticated households correctly anticipate their future pref-
erences. They only make choices that they expect to stick to in the future. A more
realistic assumption would be that households are partially sophisticated and incor-
rectly anticipate future preferences. For these households the relation between the
various market structures will be similar to those for naïve households. Therefore,
we restrict attention to naïve and (fully) sophisticated households. First, we consider
naïve and then sophisticated behavior.
4.1 Naïve behavior
In every state, naïve households sell the endowments of that particular state and the
one-period ahead endowments. They use the revenue from selling these commodities
to buy goods on the spot markets and to buy one-period ahead contingent commodities.
At each state s(t) households form expectations about all future prices. We assume
that naïve households have rational price expectations. By this we mean that in every
period and every state they have common point expectations about prices and that
prices are expected to be market clearing. Thus, rational price expectations are correct
price expectations (Radner 1972) given the belief that preferences will not change
in the future. Nevertheless, preferences can change and that will induce new rational
123
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price expectations in the future, which will again be correct from the viewpoint of that
future state.
The opportunity set of household h in state s(t) is given by
nγ hs(t)
(










∈ Xh·|s(t) × Y h·|s(t)
∣∣∣








for every τ ≥ t, for every s′(τ ) with s′(t) = s(t)
}
,
where, by definition, yhs(t)|s(t) = yhs(t)|s(t−1) and yh1|s(0) = eh1|1.





































Prices and consumption are said to constitute a naïve sequentially complete equi-
librium if consumption is in the demand sets and if markets clear and are expected to
clear in every state.
Definition 4.1 (Naïve sequentially complete (SC) equilibrium) A pair (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗)














t+1,T |s(t)) for all h ∈ H ,










h∈H eht+1,T |s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S.
4.2 Sophisticated behavior
Sophisticated households know exactly how their preferences will change in the future.
Therefore, they can correctly predict their future behavior. Moreover, they only make
plans that they expect to adhere to. They face the additional constraint that their
expected future consumption should be in their future demand sets given expected
future prices.
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The opportunity set of sophisticated household h in state s(T ) is the same as for its
naïve counterpart:
sγ hs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
s(T )|s(T −1)) = nγ hs(T )(p·|s(T ), yhs(T )|s(T −1)).
The opportunity set of sophisticated household h in state s(t), where t < T, is given
by








·|s(t)) ∈ Xh·|s(t) × Y h·|s(t) |



















s(t+1)(ps(t+1),T |s(t), qs+(t+1),T |s(t), yhs(t+1)|s(t), e
h
t+2,T |s(t+1))
for every s(t + 1) ∈ s+(t)
}
.
The demand set of a sophisticated household is given by
sδ
h
































Prices, consumption bundles and purchases of forward commodities constitute a
sophisticated sequentially complete equilibrium if actual and planned supply of spot
and forward commodities equals actual and planned demand, price expectations are
correct, and expected consumption and expected purchases of forward commodities
equal realized consumption and realized purchases of forward commodities. This is
formalized in the following definition.
Definition 4.2 (Sophisticated sequentially complete (SC) equilibrium) A pair (p∗, q∗,
x∗, y∗) ∈ P × Q × X × Y is a Sophisticated sequentially complete (SC) equilibrium













t+1,T |s(t)) for all h ∈ H ,
t ∈ T , s ∈ S,
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h∈H eht+1,T |s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
(d) p∗s(τ ),T |s(t) = p∗·|s(τ ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ ,
(e) q∗s(τ ),T |s(t) = q∗s(τ ),T |s(τ−1) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t < τ ,
(f) x∗hs(τ ),T |s(t) = x∗h·|s(τ ) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ, and
(g) y∗hs(τ ),T |s(t) = y∗hs(τ ),T |s(τ−1) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t < τ.
4.3 Properties of sequentially complete equilibria
In both naïve SC and sophisticated SC equilibria, expectations of relative prices on
spot markets are equal to the corresponding expected relative prices of assets or one-
period ahead contingent commodities, except when all those asset prices are equal to
zero. This is formalized in the following lemma. Svensson (1976) derives a similar
result in a two-period economy without uncertainty. He called these price expectations
stationary point expectations.
Theorem 4.3 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be
a naïve SC equilibrium of E . Then for every s, s′ ∈ S and every t, τ ∈ T with τ > t
and s′(t) = s(t) there is µs′(τ )|s(t) ∈ R such that
q∗s′(τ )|s(t) = µs′(τ )|s(t) p∗s′(τ )|s(t).
The result of Theorem 4.3 is driven by the arbitrage opportunities that are created
in locally non-satiated economies if the condition of the result would be violated. This
intuition is entirely correct for the naïve case. The sophisticated case is more difficult.
The reason is that a sophisticated household cannot guarantee that his future self will
behave as he would like him to behave. Therefore, changing income in a future state
may make the future self consume a bundle that the current self does not like at all.
The availability of an arbitrage opportunity in a particular state is not sufficient to
drive the result. The arbitrage opportunity needs to be such that also income in future
states is unchanged, so that future selves will behave the same, irrespective of whether
the arbitrage opportunity is taken or not. Our proof for the naïve case is constructed in
such a way that these properties are satisfied, and applies therefore to the sophisticated
case as well.
Theorem 4.4 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be
a sophisticated SC equilibrium of E . Then for every s, s′ ∈ S and every t, τ ∈ T with
τ > t and s′(t) = s(t) there is a µs′(τ )|s(t) ∈ R such that
q∗s′(τ )|s(t) = µs′(τ )|s(t) p∗s′(τ )|s(t).
An AD equilibrium (p∗, q∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to a naïve
(sophisticated) SC equilibrium if there are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y such that
(p, q, x∗, y) is a naïve (sophisticated) SC equilibrium. Similarly, a naïve (sophisti-
cated) SC equilibrium (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to an
AD equilibrium if there is p ∈ P such that (p, x∗) is an AD equilibrium.
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When preferences are time-consistent one might expect that there is no difference
between naïve and sophisticated behavior. However, this is not the case. We show
by means of an example that naïve SC equilibria are not necessarily allocationally
equivalent to AD equilibria. However, sophisticated SC equilibria are allocationally
equivalent to AD equilibria and the other way around. The difference arises because in
an AD equilibrium price expectations are correct, whereas in a naïve SC equilibrium
price expectations are only rational. The key insight used in the example is that even
in the time-consistent case, rational price expectations need not be correct. Finally,
every AD equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some SC equilibrium in both the
naïve and the sophisticated case. These results will be derived next.
The following example with time-consistent preferences displays naïve SC equi-
libria that are not allocationally equivalent to any AD equilibrium. It is borrowed from
Drèze and Herings (2003). Hellwig (1983) considered a similar example for the case
with incomplete markets.
Example 4.5 Consider a two-period economy without uncertainty. There are two
agents and two goods in every period. Endowments are eh·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2) for h = 1, 2.
Preferences are time-consistent and represented by
uh1(x
h·|1) = vh(xh1,1|1, xh1,2|1)
1







[min(x1·,1|1, x1·,2|1)], min(x1·,1|1, x1·,2|1) ≤ 1,
[(x1·,1|1 − 1)
1
2 (x1·,2|1 − 1)
1





[min(x2·,1|1, x2·,2|1)], min(x2·,1|1, x2·,2|1) ≤ 3,
[(x2·,1|1 − 3)
1
2 (x2·,2|1 − 3)
1
2 + 3], min(x2·,1|1, x2·,2|1) ≥ 3.
Now consider sequentially complete markets. Let p∗·|1 = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2),
q∗2|1 = (1/2, 1/2), p∗·|2 = (3/4, 1/4). Consider the following allocation
x∗1·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2) x∗2·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2)
x∗1·|2 = (1, 1) x∗2·|2 = (3, 3)
achieved by the asset allocations
y∗12|1 = (0, 4),
y∗22|1 = (4, 0).
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It can be verified that (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a naïve SC equilibrium. In particular it
holds that the choice of y∗12|1 = (0, 4) and y∗22|1 = (4, 0) is optimal given prices and
price expectations p∗·|1 = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2) and it holds that for the subeconomy
starting in period 2 with initial endowments y∗12|1 = (0, 4) and y∗22|1 = (4, 0), prices
p∗·|2 = (3/4, 1/4) constitute a competitive equilibrium. The prices for contingent com-
modities in period 1 are not proportional to actual prices in period 2. Thus, in period 1
households have rational expectations about prices in period 2, but in period 2 they
are confronted with different competitive equilibrium prices. Since x1·|1 = (2, 2, 1, 1)
is not individually rational for household 1 from the perspective of period 1, there can
be no p such that (p, (2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 3, 3)) is an AD equilibrium. 
When preferences are time-consistent, every AD equilibrium is allocationally equiv-
alent to some naïve and to some sophisticated SC equilibrium. This is shown in the
following theorems. Crucial in the derivation of the first result is that the set of correct
price expectations is a subset of the set of rational price expectations.
Theorem 4.6 Let preferences be time-consistent and let the economy E be locally
non-satiated. Let (p∗, x∗) be an AD equilibrium of E . Then there is (q∗, y∗) ∈ Q × Y
such that (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a naïve SC equilibrium of E .
Theorem 4.7 Let preferences be time-consistent and let the economy E be locally
non-satiated. Let (p∗, x∗) be an AD equilibrium of E . Then there is (q∗, y∗) ∈ Q × Y
such that (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a sophisticated SC equilibrium of E .
Every sophisticated SC equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some AD equi-
librium if preferences are time-consistent, as is shown next. The fact that sophisti-
cated households have correct price expectations is important for deriving this result.
Notice that we need to make some additional assumptions for this direction, because
we need optimal consumption plans to exist in the opportunity sets. The preferences
of household h are said to be acyclic if for every state s(t) there is no finite set
{xh,1·|s(t), . . . , xh,n·|s(t)} ⊂ Xh·|s(t) such that xh,i·|s(t) 
h,s(t) xh,i+1·|s(t) for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and
such that xh,n·|s(t) 
h,s(t) xh,1·|s(t). The preferences of household h are said to have open
lower sections if for every state s(t), for every xh·|s(t) ∈ Xh·|s(t), the set {̂xh·|s(t) ∈ Xh·|s(t) |
xh·|s(t) 
h,s(t) x̂ h·|s(t)} is open in Xh·|s(t).
Theorem 4.8 Let preferences be time-consistent, locally non-satiated, acyclic, and
have open lower sections, and let consumption sets be closed and bounded from below.
Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated SC equilibrium of E with p∗  0. Then there
is a p such that (p, x∗) is an AD equilibrium of E .
In general, when preferences might be time-inconsistent, there is no relation between
AD equilibria and naïve or sophisticated SC equilibria. When preferences are time-
inconsistent conflicts arise between current and future preferences. A naïve household
will typically deviate from planned consumption, since he does not anticipate a change
in his future preferences. Sophisticated households do anticipate future changes, and
are therefore constrained by their future behavior. On the contrary, the AD market
setting ensures perfect commitment in period 1, which is optimal from the perspective
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of the preferences of households in period 1. Constraints coming from the behavior
of future selves are thereby irrelevant.
5 Complete markets
In this section, there are complete markets for all possible contingent commodities at
every state of every period. Again, p·|s(t) denotes the expected (at state s(t)) prices on
the spot markets. In state s(t), the expected state s′(τ ) prices for contingent commod-
ities that are delivered in state s′′(τ̃ ) are given by q(s′′(τ̃ )|s′(τ ))|s(t), where τ̃ > τ ≥ t,
s′′(τ ) = s′(τ ), and s′(t) = s(t). The expectations in state s(t) of prices for all ‘future’
contingent commodities that can possibly be traded from state s′(τ ) on, are denoted by
q(·|s′(τ ),T )|s(t). We define Q·|s(t) = R
∑T −1
τ̃=t Lτ̃ . We let yh
(s′(τ̃ )|s′(τ ))|s(t) denote bundles
of contingent commodities that are expected at s(t) to be bought in s′(τ ) and that
are delivered in s′(τ̃ ). For notational purposes, we define yh(·|s(0))|s(0) = eh·|1. We also
define Y h·|s(t) = R
∑T −1














Q = ∏s(t) Q·|s(t).
Figure 8 illustrates the structure of complete markets and is analogous to Fig. 7.
5.1 Naïve behavior
In every state households sell their endowments which are determined by previous pur-
chases of contingent commodities. With the revenues of these sales they buy goods on
spot markets and contingent commodities on asset markets. The contingent commod-
ities bought determine the endowments at future states. In order to make a choice, a
household needs to have expectations about prices of goods and contingent commodi-
ties in the future so as to know what to buy. As before, naïve households have rational
price expectations. Thus, they all have the same point expectations about prices on
spot and forward-commodity markets and prices are expected to be market clearing.
We will show later that, in equilibrium, households cannot expect prices to change
a lot, since that would make them believe that there are arbitrage opportunities, so
that demand of some commodities would be infinite. In every period households form
new rational price expectations. The new expectations need not be equal to the expec-
tations from the period before. This again is due to the changing preferences. This
does not contradict with the fact that previous expectations were rational, since naïve
households always have the incorrect belief that their preferences will not change.
Again, rational price expectations are correct price expectations given this belief. The
opportunity set of household h in state s(t) is given by
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Fig. 8 Structure of complete
markets






·|s(t)) ∈ Xh·|s(t) × Y h·|s(t) |
ps′(τ )|s(t)xhs′(τ )|s(t)+q(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)yh(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)
≤ ps′(τ )|s(t)yh(s′(τ )|s′(τ−1))|s(t) + q(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)yh(s′+(τ ),T |s′(τ−1))|s(t)
for every τ ≥ t, and every s′(τ ) with s′(t) = s(t)
}
,
where, by definition, yh(·|s(0))|s(0) = eh·|1 and yh(·|s(t−1))|s(t) = yh(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1). The























In equilibrium all markets should clear and should be expected to clear.
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Definition 5.1 (Naïve complete equilibrium) A pair (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ P×Q×X×Y
is a Naïve Complete equilibrium of the economy E if
(a) (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈ nδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗h(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) for all h ∈ H , s ∈ S,





h∈H eh·|s(t) for all s ∈ S, t ∈ T, and
(c)
∑
h∈H y∗h(·|s(τ ))|s(t) =
∑
h∈H ehτ+1,T |s(τ ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ.
5.2 Sophisticated behavior
In period T the opportunity set of a sophisticated household h in state s is the same
as the opportunity set for its naïve counterpart, i.e.,
sγ hs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
·|s(T −1)) = nγ hs(T )(p·|s(T ), yh·|s(T −1)).
The opportunity set of a sophisticated household h in state s(t), where t < T, is given
by






·|s(t)) ∈ Xh·|s(t) × Y h·|s(t) |
(i) ps′(τ )|s(t)xhs′(τ )|s(t) + q(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)yh(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)
≤ ps′(τ )|s(t)yh(s′(τ )|s′(τ−1))|s(t) + q(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)yh(s′+(τ ),T |s′(τ−1))|s(t)
for every τ ≥ t, and every s′(τ ) with s′(t) = s(t),
and
(i i) (xhs(t+1),T |s(t), y
h
(·|s(t+1),T )|s(t)) ∈
sδhs(t+1)(ps(t+1),T |s(t), q(·|s(t+1),T )|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t))|s(t))
for every s(t + 1) ∈ s+(t)
}
.









·|s(t)) ∈ sγ hs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), yh(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) |
(xh·|s(t), y
h





Finally, we define a sophisticated complete equilibrium as follows. Note that the differ-
ence with a naïve complete equilibrium is that sophisticated households have correct
price expectations and correct expectations about future purchases.
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Definition 5.2 (sophisticated complete equilibrium) A pair (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ P ×
Q × X × Y is a sophisticated complete equilibrium of the economy E if
(a) (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈ sδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗h(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) for all h ∈ H , s ∈ S,





h∈H eh·|s(t) for all s ∈ S, t ∈ T,
(c)
∑
h∈H y∗h(·|s(τ ))|s(t) =
∑
h∈H ehτ+1,T |s(τ ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ,
(d) p∗s(τ ),T |s(t) = p∗·|s(τ ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ ,
(e) q∗(·|s(τ ),T )|s(t) = q∗·|s(τ ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ ,
(f) x∗hs(τ ),T |s(t) = x∗h·|s(τ ) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ, and
(g) y∗h(·|s(τ ),T )|s(t) = y∗h·|s(τ ) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ .
5.3 Properties of complete equilibria
The essential difference between complete (C) and sequentially complete (SC) markets
is that in complete markets there is a richer set of assets available. As a consequence,
in a three-period example for instance, under C it is possible in period 1 to make
binding commitments regarding the delivery and purchases of commodities in periods
2 and 3. When price expectations regarding periods 2 and 3 do not change, this is
inconsequential. All that matters is available wealth in each period, and not the com-
position of wealth, i.e. the distribution of wealth over the various assets. When price
expectations do change, different compositions of wealth typically do have real con-
sequences. Under SC there is less choice for the composition of wealth. In this section
we will therefore address the question of how complete and sequentially complete
equilibria relate to one another.
An AD equilibrium (p∗, q∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to a naïve
(sophisticated) complete equilibrium if there are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y such
that (p, q, x∗, y) is a naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium. Similarly, a naïve
(sophisticated) complete equilibrium (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is said to be allocationally equiv-
alent to an AD equilibrium if there is a p ∈ P such that (p, x∗) is an AD equilibrium.
A naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is said to be allocation-
ally equivalent to a naïve (sophisticated) SC equilibrium if there are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q
and y ∈ Y such that (p, q, x∗, y) is a naïve (sophisticated) SC equilibrium. A naïve
(sophisticated) SC equilibrium (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent
to a naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium if there are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y
such that (p, q, x∗, y) is a naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium.
In complete equilibria, relative prices are expected to remain unchanged. This is
proven in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be
a naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium of E . Then for every s, s′ and every t, τ
with t < τ there must be µs′(τ )|s(t) ∈ R with
q∗(s′(τ ),T |s′(τ−1))|s(t) = µs′(τ )|s(t)(p∗s′(τ )|s(t), q∗(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)).
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In general, when preferences are allowed to be time-inconsistent, there is no link
between naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibria and AD equilibria. In AD equilib-
ria, because of the commitment power provided by the AD market structure, future
selves of households have no influence. In naïve complete equilibria, future selves will
typically deviate from the plans of current selves. In sophisticated complete equilibria,
current selves are constrained by the optimizing behavior of future selves.
When preferences are time-consistent, every AD equilibrium is allocationally equiv-
alent to some naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium. This is shown in the follow-
ing two theorems.
Theorem 5.4 Let preferences in the economy E be time-consistent and let (p∗, x∗) be
an AD equilibrium of E . Then (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a naïve complete equilibrium of E,
where y∗h
(s′(τ̃ )|s′(τ ))|s(t) = x∗hs′(τ̃ )|s(t) for every h, s′, s, τ̃ > τ ≥ t and q∗(s′(τ̃ )|s′(τ ))|s(t) =
p∗s′(τ̃ )|s(t) for every s
′, s, τ̃ > τ ≥ t.
Theorem 5.5 Let preferences in the economy E be time-consistent and let (p∗, x∗)
be an AD equilibrium of E . Then (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a sophisticated complete equi-
librium of E, where y∗h
(s′(τ̃ )|s′(τ ))|s(t) = x∗hs′(τ̃ )|s(t) for every h, s′, s, τ̃ > τ ≥ t and
q∗
(s′(τ̃ )|s′(τ ))|s(t) = p∗s′(τ̃ )|s(t) for every s′, s, τ̃ > τ ≥ t.
The following example shows that even when preferences are time-consistent, not
every naïve complete equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to an AD equilibrium.
As before, this result arises because naïve households form only rational price expec-
tations.
Example 5.6 Consider Example 4.5. For two-period economies, the sequentially com-
plete market structure is identical to the complete market structure. Thus, (p∗, q∗,
x∗, y∗) is also a naïve complete equilibrium. Again, there is no p such that
(p, (2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 3, 3)) is an AD equilibrium. 
Every sophisticated complete equilibrium, however, is allocationally equivalent to
some AD equilibrium when preferences are time-consistent. Again, we need to make
some additional assumptions.
Theorem 5.7 Let preferences be time-consistent, locally non-satiated, acyclic, and
have open lower sections, and let consumption sets be closed and bounded from below.
Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated complete equilibrium of E with p∗  0. Then
(p, x∗) is an AD equilibrium of E, where p1|1 = p∗1|1 and p2,T |1 = q∗2,T |1|1.
So far we have studied the relation between AD equilibria on the one hand and SC
and complete equilibria on the other hand. Now we will analyze the relation between
the latter two. The next theorem shows that every naïve SC equilibrium is allocation-
ally equivalent to some naïve complete equilibrium. Notice that there is no need to
assume time-consistency to obtain this result.
Theorem 5.8 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a
naïve SC equilibrium of E . Then there is (p, q, y) ∈ P × Q ×Y such that (p, q, x∗, y)
is a naïve complete equilibrium of E .
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Surprisingly, there are naïve complete equilibria that are not allocationally equiv-
alent to any naïve SC equilibrium, even when preferences are time-consistent. This
is shown in the following example. The key insight is that the richer set of assets
available under complete markets may lead to initial endowments in future periods
that are not feasible under sequentially complete markets and that admit continuation
equilibria that are not feasible in the sequentially complete markets setting.
Example 5.9 Consider an economy with three periods, no uncertainty, one good per
period, and two households. Assume that each household initially owns one unit
of the good in period 1 and two units of the good in period 2 and period 3, i.e.,
e1·|1 = e2·|1 = (1, 2, 2).
Assume that both households have time-consistent preferences represented by the
utility function









Consider the complete market structure. Suppose that prices and price expecta-
tions in period 1 are given by p∗·|1 =
(




1, 1 + √2/2
)
,
and q∗(·|2)|1 = 1 +
√
2/2. Consider the case where price expectations are correct, so
p∗·|2 =
(
1, 1 + √2/2
)
, q∗(·|2)|2 = 1 +
√
2/2, and p∗·|3 = 1 +
√
2/2. It can easily
be shown that with these prices both households expect to consume and actually will
consume their initial endowments. Thus, these prices together with the consumption of
the endowments and no trade in contingent commodities constitute a naïve complete
equilibrium. It is easily verified that the same allocation can also be sustained by a
naïve sequentially complete equilibrium.
In the complete market structure households have the option to trade contingent
commodities in period 1 while still consuming their endowments in period 1. Let
prices and price expectations in period 1 be as before, p·|1 =
(





1, 1 + √2/2
)
, and q(·|2)|1 = 1 +
√
2/2. Suppose that in period 1 house-
holds trade contingent commodities for period 2 and period 3 in such a way that
x11|1 = 1,
y1(2|1)|1 = 4 +
√












2 − 2√3 − 2 .
Market clearing requires that y2(2|1)|1 = 4 − y1(2|1)|1 and y2(3|1)|1 = 4 − y1(3|1)|1. Notice
that for h = 1, 2, q(2|1)|1 yh(2|1)|1 + q(3|1)|1 yh(3|1)|1 = q(2|1)|1eh2|1 + q(3|1)|1eh3|1.
Households plan to retrade in period 2, for h = 1, 2,
yh(3|2)|1 = 2,
so xh·|1 = (1, 2, 2).
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Then the optimal consumption for household 1 is x1·|2 =
(
1, 8/(5 + √3)
)
and for
household 2, x2·|2 =
(
3, 4 − 8/(5 + √3)
)
. In period 3 it will follow that x13|3 =
y1(3|2)|2 = 8/(5 +
√
3), and x23|3 = y2(3|2)|2 = 4 − 8/(5 +
√
3). It can be verified that
(p, q, x, y) is a naïve complete equilibrium.
In sequentially complete markets consuming the endowment in the first period
implies no trade of contingent commodities. Therefore the allocation x cannot be
achieved in a naïve sequentially complete equilibrium. 
We have already mentioned that there is no relation between AD equilibria on the
one hand and naïve (sophisticated) SC or naïve (sophisticated) complete equilibria
on the other hand when preferences are not time-consistent. Theorem 5.8 shows that
every naïve SC equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some complete equilibrium
and Example 5.9 shows that the converse is not true. When we consider sophisticated
behavior, however, sophisticated SC equilibria are allocationally equivalent to sophis-
ticated complete equilibria and vice versa. This is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.10 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated. Every sophisticated SC
equilibrium of E is allocationally equivalent to some sophisticated complete equilib-
rium of E and vice versa.
6 Conclusion
Arrow (1953) showed that every Pareto optimal allocation in an Arrow–Debreu econ-
omy can be achieved both by Arrow–Debreu markets and a particular sequentially
complete market setting where first securities are traded and then spot markets are
opened. Debreu (1959) claims that, when all contingent commodities can be traded
in the first period and preferences of households do not change over time, there is no
need for markets to reopen in later periods.
In this paper we allow preferences to be time-inconsistent and we analyze three mar-
ket structures. In this richer environment, we reconsider the results of Arrow (1953)
and Debreu (1959).
We first examine the Arrow–Debreu setting where all contingent commodities can
be traded in the first period and where markets are not reopened in later periods. Next,
we consider sequentially complete markets where goods on the spot markets and all
one-period ahead contingent commodities can be traded in every state. Finally, we
consider complete markets where all contingent commodities can be traded in every
state.
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Following Pollak (1968) we make a distinction between naïve and sophisticated
behavior. Naïve households do not realize that their preferences change over time,
whereas sophisticated ones do. The latter will only make plans that they expect to
carry out in the future.
For sophisticated households, we show that sequentially complete markets are
allocationally equivalent to complete markets. For naïve households, every naïve
sequentially complete equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some naïve com-
plete equilibrium, but the converse does not hold, even if we assume that preferences
are time-consistent.
When preferences are time-consistent and households are naïve, every equilibrium
in the Arrow–Debreu setting is allocationally equivalent to some naïve sequentially
complete equilibrium and to some naïve complete equilibrium. When preferences are
time-consistent and, in addition, households are sophisticated all three market market
structures are allocationally equivalent.
Sophisticated behavior requires a lot from households, however. A more reason-
able type of behavior would be “somewhat” sophisticated. Loewenstein et al. (2003)
assume that households do make plans that they expect to stick to. However, they
assume that households mispredict their future utility function and thus will want
to reconsider their plans in the future. Here, we could model these households as
having the same budget constraints as sophisticated households, but with different
actual utility functions in later periods. For these households, it cannot be expected
that they have perfect foresight of prices and thus, the results for the naïve house-
holds in this paper would apply. As soon as we allow at least one household not to
be completely sophisticated, our paper shows that the degree of market completeness
matters.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.3 Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a naïve SC equilibrium. Consider some
s, s′ ∈ S and τ, t ∈ T with τ > t and s′(t) = s(t). Since the economy is locally non-
satiated, it is evident that p∗s′(τ )|s(t) = 0. Let l be a commodity such that p∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) = 0.
Suppose there is l̃ ∈ L such that there is no µ ∈ R with both
µp∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) = q∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) and
µp∗
s′(τ ),l̃|s(t) = q∗s′(τ ),l̃|s(t).
Then it follows that
p∗s′(τ ),l|s(t)q
∗
s′(τ ),l̃|s(t) = p∗s′(τ ),l̃|s(t)q∗s′(τ ),l|s(t).
Let h be a household such that h,s(t) is locally non-satiated in s′(τ − 1).
Case 1 Assume that
p∗s′(τ ),l|s(t)q
∗
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Now consider the vector yh·|s(t) defined by




s′(τ ),l̃|s(t) if s
′′(t ′) = s′(τ ) and l ′ = l,





s′(τ )|s(t) = 0,
i.e., in state s(t) household h could plan to buy yh·|s(t) in addition to y
∗h
·|s(t), without
changing income in state s′(τ ). Moreover,
q∗s′(τ )|s(t)y
h
s′(τ )|s(t) = q∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) p∗s′(τ ),l̃|s(t) − q∗s′(τ ),l̃|s(t) p∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) < 0.
Therefore, buying yh·|s(t) in addition to y
∗h
·|s(t) decreases expected expenditures in state
s′(τ − 1), while not changing income in any other state.
By local non-satiation this contradicts (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) being a naïve SC equilib-
rium.
Case 2 Assume that
p∗s′(τ ),l|s(t)q
∗





This case follows by repeating the argument of Case 1, replacing yh·|s(t) by −yh·|s(t).
It follows that for any l̃ ∈ L , µ = q∗s′(τ ),l|s(t)/p∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) satisfies µp∗s′(τ ),l̃|s(t) =
q∗
s′(τ ),l̃|s(t). 
Proof of Theorem 4.6 Let (p∗, x∗)be an AD equilibrium. We define q∗·|s(t)= p∗t+1,T |s(t)
for every s(t). By local non-satiation of the economy we know that for every s, s′ ∈ S,
t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and s′(t) = s(t) there is an ls′(τ )|s(t) with p∗s′(τ ),ls′(τ )|s(t)|s(t) = 0.
For every s(t), we define y∗h·|s(t) recursively as follows. Start by setting, for every h ∈ H
and every s′ ∈ S with s′(t) = s(t),
y∗hs′(T ),ls′(T )|s(t)|s(t) =
p∗s′(T )|s(t)
(
x∗hs′(T )|s(t) − ehs′(T )|s(t)
)
p∗s′(T ),ls′(T )|s(t)|s(t)
+ ehs′(T ),ls′(T )|s(t)|s(t),
and y∗hs′(T ),l|s(t) = ehs′(T ),l|s(t) for every l = ls′(T )|s(t). Then, continue by setting, for
every h ∈ H, t < τ < T, s′ ∈ S with s′(t) = s(t),
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y∗hs′(τ ),ls′(τ )|s(t)|s(t) =
p∗s′(τ )|s(t)
(
x∗hs′(τ )|s(t) − ehs′(τ )|s(t)
)
p∗s′(τ ),ls′(τ )|s(t)|s(t)










and y∗hs′(τ ),l|s(t) = ehs′(τ ),l|s(t) for every l = ls′(τ )|s(t).
Then it holds that
p∗s′(T )|s(t)y
∗h
s′(T )|s(t) = p∗s′(T )|s(t)x∗hs′(T )|s(t)















for all s, s′, h, t ≤ τ < T .
We claim that (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a naïve sequentially complete equilibrium.














It therefore holds that conditions (b) and (c) of the definition of a naïve sequentially
complete equilibrium are satisfied. It only remains to be checked that condition (a) is
satisfied as well.
Consider any t, s, h, and any (xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈ nγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1),
eht+1,T |s(t)). By summing up budget constraints, we have that
p∗·|s(t)x
h
·|s(t) + p∗t+1,T |s(t)yht+1,T |s(t)




·|s(t) ≤ p∗s(t)|s(t)y∗hs(t)|s(t−1) + p∗t+1,T |s(t)eht+1,T |s(t).
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In addition, we have
p∗s(τ )|s(τ )x
∗h












for every τ < t.
By summing all these and by keeping in mind that x∗ is a time-consistent allocation,
we find that x∗h·|1  xh·|s(t) ∈ γ̆ h1 (p∗·|1, eh·|1).
Now suppose that there are t, s, h with
(x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) /∈ nδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)).
Then there must be (x̂ h·|s(t), ŷ
h
·|s(t)) ∈ nγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)) with
x̂ h·|s(t) 
h,s(t) x∗h·|s(t). But then, by time-consistency of preferences, x∗h·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) 
h,1
x∗h·|1 . By the discussion above we also have x∗h·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) ∈ γ̆ h1 (p∗·|1, eh·|1). So x∗h·|1 /∈
δ̆h1 (p
∗·|1, eh·|1), a contradiction to the fact that (p∗, x∗) is an AD equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 4.7 Define q∗ and y∗ as in Theorem 4.6. We only need to verify
whether condition (a) of the definition of a sophisticated SC equilibrium is satisfied.
By the same argument as in Theorem 4.6 we know that for every s
x∗h·|s(T ) ∈ sδhs(T )(p∗·|s(T ), y∗hs(T )|s(T −1)).
We continue the proof by an induction argument. Assume that, for some t,
(x∗h·|s(τ ), y
∗h
·|s(τ )) ∈ sδhs(τ )(p∗·|s(τ ), q∗·|s(τ ), y∗hs(τ )|s(τ−1), ehτ+1,T |s(τ ))
for every τ > t, for every s. Suppose that
(x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) /∈ sδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)).
Then there must be (x̂ h·|s(t), ŷ
h
·|s(t)) ∈ sγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)) with
x̂ h·|s(t) 
h,s(t) x∗h·|s(t). The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.6 then leads to
a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4.8 Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated SC equilibrium. By The-
orem 4.4, for every s, s′ ∈ S and every t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and s′(t) = s(t), there
must be µs′(τ )|s(t) such that
q∗s′(τ )|s(t) = µs′(τ )|s(t) p∗s′(τ )|s(t).
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On the completeness of complete markets 195
Suppose that µs′(τ )|1 ≤ 0 for some s′(τ ). Then q∗s′(τ )|1 = µs′(τ )|1 p∗s′(τ )|1 ≤ 0. Thus,
it would be possible to increase available income in state s′(τ ) without increasing
expenditures in state s′(τ −1). A household h that, from the perspective of period 1, is
locally non-satiated in state s′(τ ), could change consumption in state s′(τ ) and have a
consumption plan that is strictly preferred to the current bundle. Since preferences are
time-consistent, the new consumption bundle would also be consistent with sophisti-
cated behavior. This yields a contradiction against x∗ being an equilibrium allocation.
It follows that µs′(τ )|1 > 0 for every s′(τ ).
Let p1|1 = p∗1|1 and ps′(τ )|1 = p∗s′(τ )|1
∏τ
τ ′=2 µs′(τ ′)|1 for every s′ ∈ S and every
τ > 1. Also, let p·|s(t) = ps(t),T |1 for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S. It holds that p  0 and
therefore that γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1) is compact.
Suppose that (p, x∗) is not an AD equilibrium. Then there is s(t) with x∗h·|s(t) /∈
δ̆hs(t)(p·|s(t), x
∗h
s(t),T |s(t−1)). Since we have x
∗h
·|s(t) = x∗hs(t),T |s(t−1) for every t > 1, it
should hold that s(t) = 1. We know that x∗h·|1 ∈ γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1). So there is xh·|1 with
xh·|1 ∈ γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1) and xh·|1 
h,1 x∗h·|1 . Since h,1 is acyclic and has open lower
sections and γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1) is compact, according to Bergstrom (1975) there exists a
maximum on γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1) with respect to h,1 . Without loss of generality, xh·|1 equals
that maximum. We define xh·|s(t) = xhs(t),T |1 for every s(t). By the same argument as
in the proof of Theorem 4.6, there must be y with (xh·|1, yh·|1) ∈ nγ h1(p·|1, p2,T |1, eh·|1)
and yhs(t+1),T |s(t) = yhs(t+1),T |1 for every s(t). Moreover, from the opportunity sets, it




1 ) ∈ nγ h1(p·|1, p2,T |1, eh·|1), then there is
y′h1 with (xh1 , y′
h
1) ∈ nγ h1(p∗·|1, q∗·|1, eh·|1) and vice versa.
Then, by definition of xh·|1 and the fact that xh·|1 
h,1 x∗h·|1 , there is s(t) such that
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) /∈ sδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), yhs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t))
for any choice of yh·|s(t). Two cases can be distinguished.




·|s(t)) ∈ sγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), yhs(t)|s(t−1),




·|s(t)) ∈ sγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), yhs(t)|s(t−1),
eht+1,T |s(t)) with x̂
h
·|s(t) 
h,s(t) xh·|s(t). By time-consistency of preferences, it follows
that xh·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) 
h,1 xh·|1. Also, it can be checked that xh·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) ∈ γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1). This
contradicts the definition of xh·|1. Thus, case 1 is not possible.




·|s(t)) ∈ sγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t),
yhs(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)). Since x
h·|1 ∈ γ̆ h1 (p·|1, eh·|1) and relative prices do not change




·|s(t ′)) /∈ sδhs(t ′)(p∗·|s(t ′), q∗·|s(t ′), yhs(t ′)|s(t ′−1), eht ′+1,T |s(t ′))
for every ỹh·|s(t ′).
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Next, as before, for s(t ′) we can distinguish two cases. We repeat this reasoning
until we end up at the last period. For the last period, we can no longer distinguish two
cases. In the last period, only case 1 can happen. This again leads to a contradiction
by a similar reasoning as before. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3 Consider some s, s′ ∈ S and t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and s′(t) =
s(t). Since the economy is locally non-satiated, it holds that p∗s′(τ )|s(t) = 0. Let l be a
commodity such that p∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) = 0.
Apart from the fact that we have more cases, the remainder of the proof is analogous
to the proof of Theorem 4.3. Suppose that there is no µ ∈ R with both
µp∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) = q∗(s′(τ ),l|s′(τ−1))|s(t),
µp∗
s′(τ ),l̃|s(t) = q∗(s′(τ ),l̃|s′(τ−1))|s(t)
or that there is no µ with both
µp∗s′(τ ),l|s(t) = q∗(s′(τ ),l|s′(τ−1))|s(t) and
µq∗
(s′′(τ̃ ),l̃|s′(τ ))|s(t) = q∗(s′′(τ̃ ),l̃|s′(τ−1))|s(t).
Next a contradiction can be obtained and the proof can be finished in a similar way as
in the proof of Theorem 4.3. 








s′(τ )|s(t) + p∗s′+(τ ),T |s(t)yh(τ+1,T |s′(τ ))|s(t) ≤ p∗s′(τ ),T |s(t)yh(s′(τ ),T |s′(τ−1))|s(t)
for every s′, τ ≥ t. By adding these over all s′(τ ) with τ ≥ t and s′(t) = s(t), we get
p∗·|s(t)x
h
·|s(t) ≤ p∗·|s(t)yh(s(t),T |s(t−1))|s(t−1). (1)
Thus, we also have
p∗·|s′(t)x
∗h
·|s′(t) ≤ p∗·|s′(t)y∗h(s′(t−1),T |s′(t−1))|s′(t) (2)
for every s′. Similarly, for all τ < t , we know that
p∗s(τ )|s(τ )x
∗h
s(τ )|s(τ ) + p∗τ+1,T |s(τ )y∗h(τ+1,T |s(τ ))|s(τ ) ≤ p∗·|s(τ )y∗h(s(τ ),T |s(τ−1))|s(τ−1), (3)
by definition of y∗. Using that p∗s(τ ),T |s(t) = p∗·|s(τ ), and taking the sum of Eq. (2)
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With this observation in mind, we can continue the proof. Since (p∗, x∗) is an
AD equilibrium and by definition of y∗, it follows immediately that conditions (b)
and (c) of the definition of a naïve complete equilibrium are satisfied. It remains
to be shown that condition (a) is satisfied as well. Suppose there are t, s(t), h with
(x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) /∈ nδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗h(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)). Then there must be
(x̂ h·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈ nγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗h(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1))
with x̂ h·|s(t) 
h,s(t) x∗h·|s(t). But then, by time-consistency of preferences, x∗h·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) 
h,1
x∗h·|1 . By our observation, it follows that x∗h·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) ∈ γ̆ h1 (p∗·|1, eh·|1). So x∗h·|1 /∈
δ̆h1 (p
∗·|1, eh·|1), contradicting that (p∗, x∗) is an AD equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 5.5 First, of all, by definition of p∗, q∗, x∗, and y∗, it follows imme-
diately that conditions (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of the definition of a sophisticated
complete equilibrium are satisfied. It remains to be shown that condition (a) is satisfied
as well.
By the same argument as used in the proof of Theorem 5.4, it holds that
(x∗h·|s(T ), y
∗h
·|s(T )) ∈ sδhs(T )(p∗·|s(T ), y∗h·|s(T −1)).
We proceed with an induction argument. Let s ∈ S, t ∈ T . Assume that
(x∗h·|s(t+1), y
∗h
·|s(t+1)) ∈ sδhs(t+1)(p∗·|s(t+1), q∗·|s(t+1), y∗h(·|s(t))|s(t))
for every s(t + 1) ∈ s+(t). Suppose that (x∗h·|s(t), y∗h·|s(t)) /∈ sδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t),








h,s(t) x∗h·|s(t). But then, by time-consistency of prefer-
ences x∗h·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) 
h,1 x∗h·|1 . By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.4
we also have x∗h·|1  x̂ h·|s(t) ∈ γ̆ h1 (p∗·|1, eh·|1). This contradicts (p∗, x∗) being an AD
equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 5.7 This proof is analogous to the proof for the sophisticated SC
equilibrium in Theorem 4.8. 
Proof of Theorem 5.8 Since (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a naïve SC equilibrium, it holds that
(x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈ nδhs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)).
For s(t), s′(τ ) with τ > t, we define µs′(τ )|s(t) as the unique real number satisfying
q∗s′(τ )|s(t) = µs′(τ )|s(t) p∗s′(τ )|s(t),
see Theorem 4.3.
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Next, we define ps(t)|s(t) = p∗s(t)|s(t),




q(s′(τ ),T |s′(τ−1))|s(t) = ps′(τ ),T |s(t).
Let yh
(s′(τ+1)|s′(τ ))|s(t) = y∗hs′(τ+1)|s(t) and yh(s′(τ+2),T |s′(τ ))|s(t) = eh·|s′(τ+2) for every
τ ≥ t and every s′ with s′(t) = s(t). Then
(x∗h·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈ nγ hs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)).
Suppose that (x∗h·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) /∈ nδhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)). Then
there must be (xh·|s(t), ỹ
h
·|s(t)) ∈ nγ hs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)) with
xh·|s(t) 




·|s(t)) ∈ nγ hs(t)(p∗·|s(t), q∗·|s(t), y∗hs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)).












Proof of Theorem 5.10 Step 1 Consider p ∈ P, q ∈ Q, q ∈ Q, and, for every s, s′,
for every τ, t with τ ≥ t and s′(t) = s(t), µs′(τ )|s(t) ∈ R such that
ps(τ ),T |s(t) = p·|s(τ ),
qs′(τ )|s(t) = µs′(τ )|s(t) ps′(τ )|s(t)
q(s′(τ ),T |s′(τ−1))|s(t) = µs′(τ )|s(t)(ps′(τ )|s(t), q(·|s′(τ ))|s(t)),
ps′(τ )|s(t) = 0.
For every s(τ ), for every yh·|s(τ−1) ∈ Y h·|s(τ−1), for every yh·|s(τ−1) ∈ Y
h
·|s(τ−1), we
will prove that whenever household h starts with the same income in both market
structures, i.e.,
ps(τ )|s(τ )yh(s(τ )|s(τ−1))|s(τ−1) +
∑
s′(τ+1)∈s+(τ )
q(s′(τ+1),T |s(τ ))|s(τ )yh(s′(τ+1),T |s(τ−1))|s(τ−1)




·|s(τ )) ∈ sγ hs(τ )(p·|s(τ ), q·|s(τ ), yh(·|s(τ−1))|s(τ−1))
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implies that there is yh·|s(τ ) ∈ Y
h
·|s(τ ) such that
(xh·|s(τ ), y
h
·|s(τ )) ∈ sγ hs(τ )(p·|s(τ ), q ·|s(τ ), yhs(τ )|s(τ−1), ehτ+1,T |s(τ ))
and vice versa. We give a proof by induction.
[Step 1a] First of all, it is obvious that for every yhs(T )|s(T −1), yhs(T )|s(T −1) with
p·|s(T )yhs(T )|s(T −1) = p·|s(T )yhs(T )|s(T −1)
it holds that
sγ hs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
s(T )|s(T −1)) = sγ hs(T )(p·|s(T ), yhs(T )|s(T −1)).
[Step 1b] Assume the result is true for every s(τ ), where τ > t.






= ps(t)|s(t)yhs(t)|s(t−1) + q(t+1,T |s(t))|s(t)eht+1,T |s(t).




·|s(t)) ∈ sγ hs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), yh(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)).
We define yh·|s(t) recursively as follows. For every s′(τ ), s(t) there is a ls′(τ )|s(t) with
ps′(τ ),ls′(τ )|s(t)|s(t) = 0.
Start by setting, for every h ∈ H,
yhs′(T ),ls′(T )|s(t)|s(t) =
ps′(T )|s(t)
(
xhs′(T )|s(t) − ehs′(T )|s(t)
)
ps′(T ),ls′(T )|s(t)|s(t)
+ ehs′(T ),ls′(T )|s(t)|s(t),
and yhs′(T ),l|s(t) = ehs′(T ),l|s(t) for every l = ls′(T )|s(t). Then, continue by setting, for
every h ∈ H, t < τ < T, s′ ∈ S with s′(t) = s(t),
yhs′(τ ),ls′(τ )|s(t)|s(t) =
ps′(τ )|s(t)
(
xhs′(τ )|s(t) − ehs′(τ )|s(t)
)
ps′(τ ),ls′(τ )|s(t)|s(t)
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∈ sδhs(t+1)(ps(t+1),T |s(t), qs+(t+1),T |s(t), yhs(t+1)|s(t), eht+2,T |s(t+1)).




·|s(t)) ∈ sγ hs(t)(p·|s(t), q ·|s(t), yhs(t)|s(t−1), eht+1,T |s(t)).
(⇐) The other direction of our result is straightforward, when following the approach
used in Theorem 5.8.
Step 2 Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated SC equilibrium. By local non-satiation
we know that for all s′(τ ), p∗s′(τ )|1 = 0. By Theorem 4.4 there is µs′(τ )|1 ∈ R such
that
q∗s′(τ )|1 = µs′(τ )|1 p∗s′(τ )|1.
We define q ∈ Q as follows.
For every s′(T ),
q(s′(T )|s′(T −1))|1 = µs′(T )|1(p∗s′(T )|1).
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Next, recursively, for τ descending from T − 1 to 2, for every s′(τ ),
q(s′(τ ),T |s′(τ−1))|1 = µs′(τ )|1(p∗s′(τ )|1, q(·|s′(τ ))|1).
Finally, for every s, s′, for every t, τ with τ ≥ t and s′(t) = s(t),
q(·|s′(τ ))|s(t) = q(·|s′(τ ))|1.
From the previous analysis it follows that there is a y such that (p∗, q, x∗, y) is a
sophisticated complete equilibrium.
Step 3 Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated complete equilibrium. Consider any
s, s′, any t, τ with τ ≥ t and s′(t) = s(t). By local non-satiation we know that
p∗s′(τ )|s(t) = 0. We define
qs′(τ )|s(t) = q∗(s′(τ )|s′(τ−1))|s(t).
From the previous analysis it follows that there is y ∈ Y such that (p∗, q, x∗, y) is a
sophisticated SC equilibrium. 
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